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Abstract: This article applies Margaret Archer’s morphogenetic 
analytical dualism framework to critically compare the sociological 
foundations underpinning the work of two key American political 
philosophers: Paul Gomberg and Nancy Fraser. Firstly, I focus upon 
Gomberg’s ideas for reforms to the division of labour and their 
impact upon race relations in the USA. I argue that, while Gomberg 
offers a radical egalitarian vision, it is flawed by its weak 
understanding of the relationships between structure and agency and 
between culture and economy. Following this, I consider Fraser’s 
theory of two-dimensional participatory justice premised upon 
distributive and recognition justice. I argue that, due to a more 
sociologically nuanced approach, her theory avoids the conflationism 
and epiphenomenalism that Gomberg lapses into. I conclude by 
noting that these conceptual issues have pertinence beyond these two 
authors and have implications for theories of distributive justice more 
generally. 
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Introduction 
How we understand the relationship between the key sociological categories of agency and 
structure, and of culture and economy, matters centrally to what political philosophy terms 
distributive justice, that is, to questions regarding how we should organise our economic and 
social institutions in order to distribute fairly the benefits and responsibilities of social co-
operation (Olsaretti, 2018: 1). This is not simply a matter of academic concern. The rise of a 
right-wing cultural-identity populism across many advanced economies has been attributed in 
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some part to the effects of growing economic inequalities (Fraser, 2017; Antonio, 2019; 
MacLeavy, 2019). In this article, I shall discuss the work of two important American political 
philosophers who have addressed themselves to these conceptual and political questions: Paul 
Gomberg and Nancy Fraser.  
I begin by considering the work of Gomberg, a philosopher with radical views on how reforms to 
the economic sphere (in particular, current divisions of labour) can address cultural antagonisms 
and act as an agent for progressive change with regard to race relations in the USA but also, by 
implication, beyond. In a previous paper (Morrison, 2019) I have argued that Gomberg's 
arguments for the normative value of high-quality work provide a valuable framework through 
which sociologists may make explicit the normally implicit value judgements that their work 
rests upon. Certainly, these ideas are starting to see wider application within sociological studies 
(Mills et al., 2016; Calder, 2016) and this points to the significance of his thesis.  
However, within this article I shall apply Margaret Archer’s (1995) morphogenetic analytical 
dualism framework to argue that, despite the ambition of Gomberg's philosophical vision, it rests 
upon a sociologically dubious understanding of agency and structure, and of economy and 
culture. These shortcomings, in turn, raise questions about its potential to improve race relations. 
Ultimately, the shortcomings that I raise in Gomberg's thesis are illustrative of wider theoretical 
fault-lines that relate to our understanding of distributive justice. In the second part of the article, 
therefore, I go beyond critique of Gomberg to outline the theory of two-dimensional 
participatory justice developed by Nancy Fraser. Fraser's work is, perhaps, better known than 
Gomberg's and has attracted much critical attention (Lovell, 2007; Olson, 2008). This thesis, I 
argue, coheres better with Archer’s (1995) analytical dualism which insists on an analytic 
separation of structure and agency and of culture and economy. Consequently, I conclude, 
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Fraser’s political philosophy is more sociologically grounded than that of Gomberg and thus has 
greater utility as theory of distributive social justice in relation to the harms of structural racism. 
The contribution of this article, therefore, is to apply a sociological analysis to two important 
theories of political philosophy, not hitherto directly compared in such a way, with the purpose 
of elucidating their sociological foundations. As I note in the conclusion, this analysis has 
implications beyond these two writers as all theories of distributive justice rest upon sociological 
suppositions. 
 
Gomberg: Contributive Justice 
In her discussion of distributive justice, Olsaretti (2018) notes that it may be understood in two 
quite different ways. On the first view, distributive justice centres upon, "…the mechanisms and 
procedures that only allocate a given amount of goods, and only a subclass of distributable 
goods, namely distributable economic goods like income and wealth" (Olsaretti, 2018: 4). This 
narrow, moneyist conception of distributive justice is the traditional, dominant perspective 
within academic and policy circles. Olsaretti (2018: 5) goes on to observe, however, that a wider 
interpretation of distributive justice is available, which "…can also take as its concern the 
productive mechanisms that affect which and what amount of distributable goods there are in the 
first place, rather than merely focusing on the mechanisms for the allocation of pre-given 
goods". Gomberg's theory of justice certainly meets this latter description. It is centrally 
concerned with societal productive mechanisms, in the form of the organisation of work, and 
with overcoming the problem of racialised patterns of unequal access to a finite number of 
skilled jobs. In this broad sense, therefore, it may be termed a theory of distributive justice, 
although it is a label that he himself resists, preferring the term 'contributive justice' to distance 
his thesis from the economistic overtones of distributive justice (Gomberg, 2018). I too have 
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accepted Gomberg's distinction in previous discussions of his work (Morrison, 2019) but here I 
employ the term distributive justice in Olsaretti's (2018) second broader sense as a flexible 
umbrella concept that captures the character of both Gomberg's and Fraser’s theories. 
There are three main elements to Gomberg's thesis: (a) his argument for the importance of 
quality work as a key social good; (b) his prescriptions for how to make it more readily available 
through radical restructuring of current employment arrangements; (c) the claims he makes about 
how these reforms will address structural racism in the United States. In drawing upon Archer's 
(1995) analytical dualism framework, I shall argue that, despite its radical philosophical vision, 
the relationship between parts (b) and (c) of Gomberg’s thesis is sociologically tenuous.  
The founding element of Gomberg’s (2007) theory is that high-quality, intrinsically meaningful 
and satisfying work is a key social good. The starting point for his thesis is that, while work is 
necessarily instrumental in being directed towards some exterior goal (provision of food, shelter 
etc), it is not entirely so. Rather, for Gomberg (2018: 514) what distinguishes work from other 
human activities is that it is a socially organised contribution to a larger group for which we gain 
recognition and which, ideally, provides some sense of personal meaning. In this sense, work has 
historically been both a natural and, in consequence, a normatively reinforced activity (Gomberg, 
2007). The relatively recent rise of modern capitalism, with its specialised division of labour and 
proliferation of low-skilled routinised jobs, has disrupted the historically socially embedded and 
participatory character of work and alienated most workers from its true purpose (Gomberg, 
2007; 2018). Gomberg wants to reclaim the importance of work that is both intrinsically 
meaningful to the individual in its utilisation of their skills and which, by extension, develops 
both personal self-esteem and social prestige. 
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Gomberg, in short, follows in a distinguished Aristotelian lineage of philosophers who argue for 
‘The Good Life’ around the principle of meaningful labour. The theory of contributive justice 
distils Gomberg's own philosophy of The Good Life into three key theses that link the social 
goods of complexity, contribution and esteem: what we are able to contribute is key to both our 
own self-esteem and how others esteem us; the contribution of complex abilities wins us greater 
self-esteem and social esteem than the contribution of routine abilities; our scope to apply and 
develop complex abilities in everyday social labour has a direct impact upon other social 
activities and affects our overall sense of well-being (Gomberg 2007: 66-7). Gomberg (2007) 
elaborates further on the relationship between these three theses through his discussion of ‘norms 
of identity’ and ‘norms of prestige’. In terms of paid employment, norms of identity refer to the 
standards expected of our contribution within a job; in that respect, norms of identity are the 
norms that are internal to the work and to the skill content of that job. We may compare this with 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s better-known concept of ‘internal goods’: the sense of achievement we 
may obtain from doing a job or other task well in relation to standards within that field of 
practice (MacIntyre, 1981: 188). By contrast, norms of prestige relate to the relative social status 
that a particular job attracts, wherein higher skilled employment tends to enjoy higher social 
prestige; in this regard, norms of prestige are the norms that are external to any individual 
employee’s actual performance within their job. Again, there is a close analogy with MacIntyre’s 
(1981: 190) ‘external goods’: the prestige or money that result from performing an activity well 
but which, unlike internal goods, are competitively fought-over goods which do not have a 
necessary relationship to the activity itself. 
The distinction between Gomberg’s two types of norms is not watertight nor meant to be. For 
example, the norms of identity derived from a competent and valued contribution to a job, 
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including a relatively low-skilled routinised one, may be a source of both self-esteem and social 
esteem (Gomberg, 1995; 2007). Furthermore, while Gomberg (2007: 87) is correct to say that 
wealth is the key determinant of prestige in marketised societies and that low-skill employment 
is typically low-paid and therefore lacking in social recognition, he also argues that there exists a 
close correlation between occupations of ‘complex mastery’ and high pay. On this latter point, 
Gomberg requires more nuance as the two do not neatly map onto each other. Nevertheless, 
Gomberg (2007) makes a good general point: that in a highly competitive, socially hierarchical 
society such as the US, different forms of employment attract very different levels of social 
prestige. Furthermore, the social competition of marketised societies means that there exists a 
closely dependent relationship between the two types of norms: waged labour is a key source of 
social prestige and because of the centrality of this norm within our social subjectivities, it also 
strongly shapes most individuals’ self-esteem. Moreover, the division of labour that characterises 
modern capitalist economies and the resultant competition for a finite number of high-skilled, 
socially prestigious jobs means that both social prestige and, consequently, self-esteem become 
limited, fought-over social goods (Gomberg, 2007; 2016). Finally, Gomberg (2007; 2016) notes 
that in the US this competition takes place over an extremely unlevel playing field: deeply 
embedded discriminatory practices support an enduring racialised black-white division of labour 
in which African-Americans cluster disproportionately within low-skilled, less prestigious 
employment. For Gomberg (2007), problems that are rooted deep within the political economy 
require suitably radical structural solutions, and here I turn to the second part of his theory of 
contributive justice. 
To address the social problems of work, Gomberg (2007) proposes dismantling the division 
between routine and complex labour, a suggestion that marks his thesis as particularly innovative 
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and radical. He contends that the operative division between what is routine or complex may be 
found internal to most tasks and is not a naturally occurring division in the organisation of labour 
(Gomberg, 2007: 81). However, under contemporary employment specialisms, many people in 
wholly routinised work have little or no autonomy over their own labour processes and so will 
necessarily become alienated from them. The solution, therefore, is that all workers must share 
in the routine tasks of such workers, thus freeing this group to develop higher-level skills if they 
so wish (Gomberg, 2007: 81). This opens up the possibility of sharing out tasks of different skill-
levels and interest equally across all workers so that high-quality employment does not become 
the preserve of particular social groups. For Gomberg (2007) the (at least potentially) unlimited 
opportunity to access high-skill work produced by these reforms is more radically egalitarian 
than liberal attempts to provide equal opportunities to obtain a limited number of good jobs 
within a competitive field.  And this emphasis upon equality of outcome leads on to the third 
element of Gomberg’s theory: the claims he makes about how these reforms will address 
structural racism, and particularly that of the black-white binary divide, in the United States. 
The starting point for Gomberg’s (2007: 101) ideas about race is that in a political economy 
based upon finite opportunities for skilled and meaningful work, scarcity has to be socially 
managed in order to avoid instability. In the USA, race and other categories perform the function 
of organising limited opportunity through practices of racism (Gomberg, 2007: 37). The solution 
to this is to make opportunity for self-esteem and social prestige available to all through the work 
innovations outlined above. Gomberg makes a number of claims for how this will help to tackle 
structural racism in the United States. On one level, he argues for its effects upon workplace-
level discrimination, “Racism in distribution of work requiring complex abilities is ended when it 
is not skewed away from black workers” (Gomberg, 2007: 131). On another level, he contends 
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that the impact of work reforms will be felt far beyond the workplace itself and extend to intra-
class relations, “Sharing labor, we can transform relationships and eliminate racial conflict 
within the working class” (Gomberg, 2007: 129). However, Gomberg’s vision is ultimately 
larger still and aims to reshape social subjectivities:  
 
“Relationships are transformed. The social psychology of vanity, 
jealousy of others’ accomplishments and, on a group level, racism, 
arises from competition for limited positions of prestige…When labor 
is shared, esteem earned from contribution of complex abilities is not 
scarce and others are no longer competitors for it.” (Gomberg, 2018: 
527) 
 
This ideal requires that we eschew moneyist distributive justice since payment for our labour 
encourages us to see work as a disutility and to labour for ourselves and not for others; in 
institutional terms, this utopia translates as a “moneyless communist society” (Gomberg, 2018: 
528). In the next section, I draw upon elements of Archer's (1995) morphogenetic analysis to 
argue that while Gomberg's vision may address the first of these levels--discriminatory 
workplace practices--its claims to tackle the wider harms of racism founder upon a number of 
problems with its sociological underpinnings. 
 
Structure and Agency 
A key tenet of Archer's (1995) approach is the concept of analytical dualism: an understanding 
that structure and agency are analytically separable entities distinguished through their distinct 
properties and temporalities. On this latter point, the notion of antecedence is important. As 
Archer (1995: 165) notes, “Society is that which nobody wants, in the form in which they 
encounter it, for it is an unintended consequence”. In other words, we are all born 
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involuntaristically into a pre-existing society, the structure and culture of which shape us, but 
which we, in turn, also shape. Different temporalities also produce different properties. Because 
we are all born into a society, the structural and cultural relations which we inherit and which 
help to form us are relatively autonomous from agency in the sense that they pre-date present-
day social actors and therefore have a degree of free-floating ‘objective’ life outside of any 
individual’s apprehension of them. Agency is crucial however since, as Archer (1995: 184) 
insists, socio-cultural conditioning is only able to apply its effects on people and is only effective 
by means of people, with the result that no prior structural or cultural influence functions 
deterministically as a ‘hydraulic pressure’, but rather may be open to reflective evaluation by 
agents. Archer (1995) elaborates further on the complexity of the structure-agency relationship 
through the three-stage morphogenetic cycle, whereby: (a) structural and cultural antecedent 
conditions develop as a consequence of past social actors’ socio-cultural interactions, their 
temporality making them relatively autonomous from; (b) present-day social and cultural 
interaction where social actors (individual and collective) pursue interests under conditions 
obtained in stage (a); (c) structural and cultural elaboration where social actors and agents both 
consciously and unintentionally reproduce/transform the conditions at stage (a). 
What, though, does this analytic tell us about Gomberg’s own treatment of agency and structure? 
As I have noted, Gomberg’s sociology is clearly structuralist in its attendance to processes of 
cultural inferiorisation (racism) through macro-economic reforms (work arrangements). 
However, Gomberg’s view of the relationship between structure and agency falls into a form of 
‘downwards conflationism’ whereby “...structure and agency are conflated because action is 
treated as fundamentally epiphenomenal…”  (Archer, 1995: 81). For Archer (1995: 83) 
downwards conflationists lack historicity because they do not accept that social structures have 
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been created by the past actions of social agents--that social structures have social origins. 
Consequently, as Archer (1995: 84) argues, they “…basically restrict their treatment of structure 
and agency to an examination of the impress of structure upon agency in the present” (emphasis 
in original).  
To be clear, the charge against Gomberg in this respect is not that his analysis of racism lacks a 
historical perspective per se. In various publications he has demonstrated a detailed knowledge 
of the deep historical roots of present-day white-black relations in the USA (Gomberg 2007; 
2016; 2017). The point, rather, is that Gomberg’s historicity collapses under the burden of 
expectations that he applies to structural reform. The weight of cultural history and its semi-
autonomous conditioning of social actors’ perspectives are expected simply to be lifted away 
through changes to present-day structure in the form of the division of labour. In terms of 
Archer's (1995) three-stage morphogenetic cycle, it appears that Gomberg's claims for the 
positive impacts of labour reforms on structural racism move us from stage (b) to stage (c) 
without sufficient attention to the conditioning influences of stage (a). And this is an important 
omission: a voluminous body of literature illustrates the significance of antecedent cultural 
relations in shaping the enduring but always evolving character of white-black racism in the 
United States (Wacquant, 2000; Alexander, 2012; Omi and Winant, 2015). In fact, the absence 
of a sense of temporality in Gomberg’s thesis accords structure both an overly substantial role 
(as being over-determining of agency) and a curiously insubstantial one (whereby centuries of 
racism dissolve). 
 
Structure/Economy and Culture 
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Another important element of critical realism, as elaborated by Archer (1995), is the distinction 
between what she terms structural and cultural ‘emergent properties’. For Archer (1995: 167), an 
emergent property (EP) essentially refers to society’s deep sub-structures which are relatively 
enduring and which possess causal powers over social life. Again, the notion of antecedence is 
important here since they are formed through the past socio-cultural interactions of previous 
social actors but exert a conditioning (though never determining) influence upon present-day 
actors. Importantly, the term ‘emergent’ is not simply a synonym for ‘combination’. An EP is a 
complex of different interlinking elements which are characterised by the ‘natural necessity’ of 
their relationship to each other and which are not reducible to individual parts (Archer, 1995: 
167). Class relations and the positions that social groups occupy within them are a good example 
of an emergent property. For example, the relationship between income distribution and class 
location is a necessary one in the sense that one cannot be understood without reference to the 
other. Race is also an EP in that same sense because ideas about race are a complex amalgam of 
inherited cultural perspectives, interpreted by present-day social actors, which exist in some form 
of logical relation to other ideas with which they variously compete, concur or contradict: a 
belief in tolerance, equality or freedom (Carter, 1998: 7). 
Class and race also exemplify Archer’s (1995) distinction between structural and cultural EPs. 
Here, Archer employs the term 'structural' to denote that certain types of social relations depend 
primarily upon material resources, both physical and human (Archer, 1995: 175). Structural is 
not, therefore, coterminous with 'economic' within Archer's (1995) schema but, rather, the latter 
is subsumed within the former. And it is in this sense that I employ the term structural in my 
critique of Gomberg's approach to the relationship between economy and culture. For Archer 
(1995: 175), class relations are a clear example of a structural EP, being necessarily defined 
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ultimately by their non-discursive, material relations. This is a point supported by Ray and Sayer 
(1999: 14) who also note that, by the same token, distributions of income or wealth have no 
necessary connection to any discursively ascribed characteristics of social groups such as 
racialised minorities. Another aspect of the core materiality of structural EPs such as class 
relations is that their existence may ultimately be sustained by extra-discursive means. Thus, 
although material relations (such as the distribution of income) may be maintained by ideas, they 
are not necessarily so and may, in the final instance, be enforced by coercion or manipulation, 
thereby eschewing the need for legitimation (Archer, 1995: 175). 
In Archer’s (1995: 180) schema, culture is distinguished from structure through its necessarily 
subjective, propositional properties; it refers to all ‘intelligibilia’—items with the dispositional 
capacity of being understood and interpreted by individuals. The social construction of race is 
just such a cultural item. And, as a cultural item, ideas about race have an objective existence. 
This is not in the sense of being right or wrong; rather, it is by virtue of the fact that such ideas 
are a product of past social interactions and have now slipped free of their progenitors through 
relatively enduring representations in books, films, theories, discourses etc which now condition 
present-day social actors’ interpretations (Carter, 2000: 83). Again, however, the temporality of 
analytical dualism permits us to see agency as the key mediating factor here. This temporality is 
best expressed in Archer’s (1995) distinction between ‘system integration’ and ‘social 
integration’. The former refers to both structural and cultural antecedent conditions while the 
latter indicates present-day socio-cultural interactions (Archer, 1995: 183). The two forms of 
integration are by no means always in congruence and, in times of social friction, may be at 
odds. Consequently, as Archer (1995: 181) observes, while culture may inhibit, it also embodies 
new possibilities and thus agency is never simply a direct restatement of cultural structures. 
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How then does this framework help to cast a light on Gomberg’s treatment of economy and 
culture in his discussions of race and the transformation of work practices? Gomberg’s analysis 
is of a clearly Marxian kind: the origins and effects of racism are viewed through the lens of 
class oppression. Gomberg (2017) applies the classical Marxian Reserve Army of Labour (RAL) 
thesis to argue that high unemployment and a low-wage, vulnerable workforce is fundamentally 
functional to the efficient workings of capital accumulation within the US. Furthermore, the 
black-white binary has historically been, and continues to be, the principal organising 
categorisation through which the RAL has been constituted and maintained (Gomberg, 2007; 
2017). Gomberg (2017) notes the enduring power of oppressive racist structures in the USA and 
their ability to adapt to resistance and to evolve new forms of domination: the shifts from chattel 
slavery, to Jim Crow segregation to more recent forms of exploitation via welfare, immigration 
and mass incarceration policies. This is an analysis he shares with other US commentators on 
race (Wacquant, 2000; Alexander, 2012; Omi and Winant, 2015). Where Gomberg differs from 
these writers, however, is in his insistence that, because racism is functional to capitalism, it is 
also a by-product of it that can only be removed by the ending of capitalism itself (Gomberg, 
2017: 73). And it is here that race, in Gomberg’s analysis, becomes collapsed into class. 
 
Gomberg (2007; 2017) is at pains to emphasise that he does not dismiss the significance of the 
particular harms of racism in a society predicated upon race divisions. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that racism, as expressed in racialised divisions of labour and skill, is ultimately seen as a sub-
category of wider class inequalities. He makes this point explicitly in arguing that, “…what black 
people experience is a severe and generalized version of what many workers of all “races” 
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experience at work every day. Subordinate workers at work are not full persons.” (Gomberg, 
2007: 135). He elaborates on this point, perhaps controversially, with what might read as a rather 
careless conflation of degraded labour with formal chattel slavery, “Explore the term “wage 
slavery,” used by nineteenth century socialists. A slave is a body under the will of another; the 
slave’s will is impotent. A chattel slave is a slave all of the time. A wage slave is a slave for a 
period of hours” (Gomberg, 2007: 134). The sum of this analysis is that race is not accorded a 
special causal status—and the corollary to this is that the solution to racist work practices is not 
to focus on race per se, by addressing the conditions of African-Americans in the US, but by 
aiming to eliminate the class inequalities that the capitalist division of labour inevitably 
produces: 
 
“…if it is wrong for black people to suffer from higher unemployment, 
why is it better for others to suffer from unemployment and the 
concomitant loss of status? If it is wrong for the routine jobs to be 
skewed toward black workers, why is it better if someone else must 
work those jobs? Equality requires sharing labor.” (Gomberg, 2007: 
136). 
 
There are potentially many things to unpick from Gomberg’s arguments but, for the purposes of 
this present article, I shall apply critique by making further reference to Archer’s (1995) 
distinction between the necessary and the merely contingent relations between social entities. As 
indicated previously, where the relations between the components of a social item serve to define 
what the entity is to the extent that its very existence depend on these, these may be characterised 
as necessary relations. By contrast, contingent relations between entities are characterised by a 
relationship that, although it may be felt experientially close, are not necessary because it is not 
impossible that one could exist without the other and the nature of either does not require them to 
exist together (Archer, 1995: 173).  
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Following this framework, I argue that Gomberg mistakes contingency for necessity in his 
assumptions of the relationship between culture (race/racism) and economy/structure (the 
division of labour) in that both could exist without the other. If we focus on the culture-economy 
side of the equation, there is no reason in principle why capital accumulation, even in the USA, 
could not take place in a differently racialised or even non-racialised social system (Carter, 1998; 
2000; Ray and Sayer, 1999)—a point we may extend to other forms of social domination such as 
patriarchy (Sayer, 2005: 88). At this point, I want to echo Carter’s (1998: 7) comment on much 
the same point: contingent here does not imply arbitrariness; race ideas and racist practices have 
played a central role in defining whose labour power should be sold and under what conditions, 
and nowhere is this more true of advanced capitalist nations than the USA. Capitalism, in other 
words, undoubtedly benefits from structural racism in its concrete practices. Nevertheless, the 
relationship is ultimately a contingent rather than a necessary one. However, the more pertinent 
question for my argument is the economy-culture side of the equation: would the abolition of 
capitalism (at least as presently constituted through current divisions of labour as per Gomberg) 
serve to eradicate structural racism in the USA? Or, to put it another way, can the latter exist 
without the former? Or, on a more conceptual plain, does culture have its own semi-autonomous 
causal powers outside of structural/economic conditions? 
I believe that Gomberg’s philosophy pays insufficient attention to these fundamental sociological 
questions and falls short in consequence. Race is collapsed into a sub-category of class and 
Gomberg’s radicalism is then restricted to that conceptual lens with the consequence that reforms 
that may address class relations directly would only engage tangentially with racism. Thus, the 
effect of Gomberg’s (2007; 2017) changes to the division of labour is to restructure some of the 
necessary and internal properties of class relations. This approach is consistent with Gomberg’s 
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(2018: 518) focus upon workplace relations and his reforms may well serve to tackle 
discriminatory racism in the distribution of skilled and meaningful employment. However, as I 
have indicated, Gomberg goes beyond this claim to argue that contributive justice may address 
the wider cultural harms of racism. My critique here, though, is that employment relations are by 
no means the only site for the reproduction of racist practices and that too much is being asked of 
workplace reforms to effect wider cultural change. This, in turn is a consequence of Gomberg’s 
treatment of culture as epiphenomenal to economy/structure in a way that fails to acknowledge 
the distinction between the two and the semi-autonomous causal powers of each from the other.  
And the literature on race in the USA offers powerful evidence to substantiate the need to 
maintain a binary economy/structure and culture analysis. There is not space here to do justice to 
the richness and complexity of the theoretical perspectives which have been applied to this area. 
In essence, though, while many prominent writers within the field recognise the central role of 
capital accumulation in creating the conditions for race relations in the USA, race itself cannot 
just be reduced to class (Wacquant, 2000; Alexander, 2012; Omi and Winant, 2015). There is 
simply too much else to explain about racism that cannot be understood through an exclusively 
class-focused conspectus. Empirical studies into race in the US also support the contention that 
race ideas possess their own distinct causal powers and effects quite apart from those of class. 
Even where class (in the economistic sense) is held constant, race powerfully conditions where 
individuals live and, consequently, the resources to which they have access (Moore, 2008; 
Sampson, 2019). Similarly, recent studies employing a Critical Race Theory perspective have 
shone a powerful light upon the everyday microaggressions to which African-American pupils 
are subject and from which a middle-class economic status provides no refuge (Allen, 2012; 
Reynolds, 2010). 
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Disciplinary boundaries? 
Thus far I have discussed the theory of contributive justice as elaborated by the US political 
philosopher Paul Gomberg. I have applied some key elements of Archer’s (1995) analytical 
dualism to argue that, despite the radicalism of Gomberg’s philosophical vision, the claims he 
makes for his proposals in relation to racism lack sound sociological foundations. At this point, 
however, a critic may counter that contributive justice is the work of a political philosopher and 
not of a sociologist. While the work of a sociologist lies primarily in analysing what is, a 
political philosopher concerns themselves with what ought. Consequently, Gomberg’s focus is 
necessarily normative as opposed to the more analytically descriptive work of sociology: it is 
upon the elaboration of a utopian future. The utopianism of contributive justice is a quality that 
Gomberg (2007: 158) strongly defends against possible charges that his thesis is overly 
idealistic. His utopianism, he argues, is of the type that floats ideas for debate and which in 
consequence is unobjectionable; and as a philosophical thought-experiment there may be little 
objection to the fact that his thesis places its focus upon the third stage of Archer’s (1995) three-
stage cycle—structural and cultural change—while the first two stages are relatively neglected. 
Nevertheless, if we continue in applying Archer’s (1995) morphogenetic analysis to the theory of 
contributive justice, it is clear that Gomberg is making claims about the causal powers of his 
proposed reforms to social and cultural structures. That is, in asserting the transformative effects 
on racist social structures of his restructurings of the division of labour, Gomberg is making 
claims of an inescapably sociological type. It is appropriate, therefore, that a work of political 
philosophy that makes such contentions is held up to a measure of sociological scrutiny to 
evaluate its utility as a theory. And, on this point, I now turn to the work of Nancy Fraser. 
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Fraser: two-dimensional participatory justice 
As a critical social philosopher, Fraser’s work, like Gomberg’s, is centrally concerned with the 
analysis of and remedies for social injustices under conditions of advanced capitalist 
development. For Fraser (1999), as with Gomberg, society is composed of real structural 
groupings that are based in relatively enduring socio-cultural orders of differentiation and 
hierarchy. Class, gender and race have been key areas of interest. However, a key point of 
departure between the two writers lies in what I argue to be Fraser’s more sociologically 
sophisticated treatment of the relationship between economic and cultural forces and between 
agency and structure. 
 
Economy and Culture 
In adopting a ‘dual-systems’ approach, Fraser contends that inequalities are the product of the 
comingling of analytically separable economically-rooted and culturally-rooted forms of 
injustice. And, perhaps paradoxically, it is the very complex mixing of the two, an effect of 
developments in late modern capitalism, that requires such a dual analytical approach. Thus, 
processes of personal responsibilisation now mean that cultural activities have become 
increasingly, although not wholly, economically inflected; similarly, “…the economy is not a 
culture-free zone, but a culture-instrumentalizing and re-signifying one. Thus, what presents 
itself as 'the economy' is always already permeated with cultural interpretations and norms…" 
(Fraser 1999: 44). The role of critical theory for Fraser is to problematise accepted substantive 
distinctions between the 'public' and the 'private', and the 'economic' and the 'cultural'. Her 
contribution in this respect is a 'two-dimensional participatory parity' theory of social justice 
premised upon what Fraser (1999) terms 'perspectival dualism'. 
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 Perspectival dualism offers a distinction between injustices associated with cultural 
inferiorisation that originate in society’s cultural-valuational order (what Fraser terms 
'misrecognition') and those that have their roots in unequal material-economic arrangements 
(which Fraser calls 'maldistribution') (Fraser, 1999). The relevant forms of remedy are 
'recognition justice' and 'distributive justice' (Fraser, 1999). These distinctions are themselves 
based upon Fraser’s (1999) division between 'economy' and 'culture'. Fraser (1999) is at pains to 
emphasise that the distinctions she makes between these categories are analytical and not 
substantive or ontological. Economy and culture (and their attendant injustices of misrecognition 
and maldistribution) are 'social processes and social relations' that have emerged as a 
consequence of the fact that, in advanced capitalist societies, class (as understood in the 
economistic sense) and status (in the Weberian sense) no longer neatly map onto each other 
(Fraser, 1999: 40).  In real life, all social practices involve a concrete intertwining of both 
economic and cultural dimensions (although not always in equal degrees). For Fraser (1999), 
though, the value of the analytical separation she makes between the two forms of injustice, and 
their associated remedies, is that it permits us to focus upon the cultural aspects of what may 
normally be regarded as economic policies and to highlight the economic dimensions of what are 
typically seen to be cultural processes (Fraser 1999: 45).  
The comparisons between Fraser’s schema and Archer’s distinction between structural and 
cultural emergent properties (EPs) are apparent. In employing a dual-systems approach, Fraser is 
able to accord both economic and cultural forces causal powers in a way that Gomberg’s 
sociology cannot. Thus, her thesis avoids the pitfall, which I have argued that Gomberg enters 
into, of treating culture as mere epiphenomenon to economy and of mistaking contingency for 
necessity in the relationship between race and divisions of labour. On a Fraserian reading, racism 
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is a product of a complex concrete intertwining of cultural forces (race ideas) and economic 
forces. Race itself is, therefore, a key example of what Fraser (1995: 74) terms a ‘bi-valent’ 
category: one that is rooted simultaneously in the economic structure and in the cultural status 
order of society. And, this form of perspectival dualism requires an appropriately flexible 
normative theory of justice. 
Fraser’s perspectival dualism translates into a critically normative theory of justice that addresses 
itself to economically-rooted distributive justice and culturally-rooted recognition justice: a twin 
approach summed up by the concept of ‘parity of participation’. (A later development of this 
theory incorporated a third dimension of representation. For the purposes of this article, 
however, I shall limit discussion to Fraser’s original two dimensions). By parity of participation, 
Fraser means, “…the condition of being a peer, of being on a par with others, of standing on an 
equal footing” (Fraser, 1999: 50n, emphasis in original). There are three key criteria for this, all 
of which address themselves to the workings of social structures. Firstly, the theory stipulates 
legal equality which refers to full recognition of rights before the law. The second criterion 
requires that the distribution of material resources be of a reasonably equitable level so as to 
ensure the potential for all social actors’ ‘voice’ and independence. These two requirements are 
what Fraser (1999) terms the ‘objective’ preconditions of participatory parity. The third 
precondition is 'intersubjective’ parity'. This criterion demands that the ‘cultural patterns of 
interpretation and evaluation’ expressive of social institutions confer equal levels of respect upon 
all social actors and thus provide them with equal opportunities for gaining social esteem (Fraser, 
1999: 37). Both types of preconditions need to be met for individuals to achieve full participatory 
parity, as neither alone is adequate. 
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It will be evident from the above that two different treatments of the categories of economy and 
culture have produced two quite distinct theories of distributive justice, if we accept Olsaretti's 
(2018) second more generous view of the concept. Thus, Gomberg’s particular take on Marxian 
structuralism has led him to propose economic reform in order to effect cultural change, the 
idiosyncrasy of his vision lying in the rejection of financial redisdtribution in favour of 
redistribution of the social goods of meaningful work and social recognition. By contrast, 
Fraser’s two-dimensional theory incorporates a traditional narrowly economistic view of 
distributive justice, but this is complemented by an analytically parallel concept of recognition 
justice aimed at the more equal distribution of cultural recognition. Furthermore, differences in 
the two writers’ treatments of structure and agency become apparent if we consider Fraser’s 
discussions of her proposed remedies for social injustices. 
Structure and Agency  
Fraser shares Gomberg’s radical egalitarianism, although her proposals are quite different. She 
argues that the solution to deeply-rooted structural injustices (both economically-based and 
culturally-based) is through what she terms ‘transformative remedies’, that is, “…remedies 
aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative 
framework” (Fraser 1995: 82). A good example of this approach can be found in Fraser’s (2013: 
134) vision of a ‘Universal Caregiver’ welfare state (for the USA) in which all jobs would be 
designed with a much shorter working week than present-day full-time work to meet the needs of 
workers who are caregivers; domestic caregiving itself would receive substantial public financial 
support and be incorporated into a single social insurance system on a par with paid work. 
Fraser’s purpose here is to effect distributive justice via a mass reallocation of state financial 
resources towards the unpaid work of domestic care that capitalism relies upon.  Equally, though, 
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Fraser (2013) seeks to achieve radical recognition justice: state financial support for caregiving 
aims to dismantle the androcentric norms that sustain the highly gendered binary divide between 
paid work and unpaid domestic labour and to share out the latter equally. And the form of 
political economy that Fraser (1995: 84) most closely associates with these types of remedies is 
socialism; however, it is a socialism that accepts tightly regulated market relations where these 
can offer the potential to counter extra-economic forms of domination (Fraser 2013: 232). 
Thus, Fraser, like Gomberg, offers a far-reaching philosophy for change. However, where Fraser 
differs from Gomberg is in her more sophisticated acknowledgement of the conditioning effects 
of antecedent economic and cultural structures and their impact upon the potential for change. In 
different articles, Fraser has drawn upon the socio-historical frameworks offered by (among 
others) Polanyi (Fraser, 2013) and Gramsci (Fraser, 2017) to more fully historicise her normative 
ideas. Fraser recognises, therefore, that structure can be enabling but also constraining—a 
perspective that sits well with Archer’s (1995) critical realist treatment of structural and cultural 
relations. Consequently, Fraser is realistic about the extent to which her proposed remedies may 
be realisable. She notes, for example, that although socialism is ‘cognitively compelling’, for 
most people it is ‘experientially remote’, while a transformative politics of recognition, “…could 
turn out to be too negative and reactive, i.e. too deconstructive, to inspire struggles on behalf of 
subordinated collectivities attached to their existing identities” (Fraser, 1995: 91, n46, emphasis 
in original).  
As I have previously indicated, Gomberg’s discussions on race are by no means without a sense 
of history; my argument has been that history collapses under the weight of expectation attached 
to structural reform and agency becomes sidelined as epiphenomenonal to structure. And here I 
believe that Fraser has a stronger understanding than Gomberg of the importance of agency in 
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mediating structure to effect change. To bridge the gap between the ambition of her 
transformative remedies (located at stage three of Archer’s morphogenetic cycle) and the 
conditioning effects of prior structural and cultural relations (stage one of Archer’s cycle), Fraser 
accords agency (stage two of Archer’s cycle) a stronger role than appears within Gomberg’s 
thesis. This is well illustrated by Fraser’s powerful commitment to public dialogue as a means to 
determine the public needs that transformative remedies may deliver upon. In line with her dual-
systems approach that sees the economic in the cultural and vice versa, Fraser is dedicated to 
fostering a public debate that actively troubles accepted borders between the two spheres. As 
Fraser (1997: 88) contends, social inequalities become legitimated and entrenched when the 
discourse of 'economic privacy' attempts to partition some interests or issues from the sphere of 
public debate by “economizing” them and framing them as simple private or technocratic matters 
pertaining to impersonal market forces, the result here being to 'enclave' social problems to the 
disadvantage of subordinated groups (Fraser, 1997: 88). 
 
The Sociology of Distributive Justice 
This article has made a study of the work of two political philosophers not previously directly 
compared. I have applied Archer’s (1995) morphogenetic analysis to evaluate the assumptions 
on the relationship between structure and agency, and between economy and culture, that guide 
their theories. I have considered how the cogency of both writers’ ideas, as theories of 
distributive justice in relation to racism, rests in large part upon their different understandings of 
these foundational sociological concepts. And I now conclude with some further comments on 
the role that sociology may play in relation to such theories. 
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In her summary view of the field, Olsaretti (2018: 3) notes some features of theories of 
distributive justice. The first pertains to their preconditions: the circumstances that must exist for 
questions of distributive justice to be relevant at all. Here, Olsaretti (2018: 3) observes that a 
consensus has coalesced around the view that questions of distributive justice emerge only when 
there is a relative scarcity of goods—neither great plenitude nor an extreme want. Under such 
conditions, questions of identity and conflicts of interest arise that require principles through 
which to reach an equitable solution. The second feature is the primary subject of distributive 
justice, which refers to where the injustices (and attendant remedies) should be located: in 
individual acts, all social practices or just particular institutions (Olsaretti, 2018: 4). Finally, for 
the purposes of this discussion, there is the object of distribution, which relates to what is to be 
distributed: money goods and/or other social goods such as social recognition or esteem. 
If we consider the first of these features, we can see that race in the USA and beyond is certainly 
a site of relative scarcity of both material and non-material social goods. Having established such 
preconditions, a theory of distributive justice seeking to address the harms of racism will 
typically then be guided by underlying assumptions regarding its subject and its object. It has 
been the argument of this article that a cogent understanding of the subject of such a theory (the 
social locating of racism) requires an analytical dualism that permits us to see racism as both 
economically and culturally rooted and as a product of the dialectic between structure and 
agency. Analytical dualism of agency-structure is a necessary sociological frame for a theory of 
distributive justice of race because, although racism is powerfully conditioned by antecedent 
cultural and economic structures, it is also ever mutable and subject to the agency of socio-
cultural interaction. Finally, following Olsaretti (2018), a theory of distributive justice directed at 
redressing racist injustices must then decide upon its object. However, where there is a 
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theoretical lacuna with regard to the subject of the theory, this may follow through to its object. 
This has been a criticism that I have levelled at Gomberg’s vision of effecting broad cultural 
change through economic levers: that the latter is insufficient to support the weight of the former. 
This, then, provides a clear argument for the importance of maintaining an understanding of the 
relatively autonomous causal powers of economic and cultural structures. Theories of 
distributive justice, whether focused upon race or other axes of social hierarchisation, are 
embedded in sociological assumptions; sociology, therefore, has a valuable role in inspecting the 
foundations of such theories. 
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